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The idea of deceit in *Epitome de Tito Livio* by Florus¹

Abstract: The article outlines the variety of trickery vocabulary in *Epitome de Tito Livio*, written by Lucius Annaeus Florus in the 2nd century A.D. Among the Latin nouns that are equivalents of Greek trickery terms, it is necessary to mention especially *dolus*, *fraus*, *consilium*, *ars*, *furtum* and *sollertia*. Their use demonstrates Florus' skillfulness and ability to show the arcana of ancient history, tradition and culture in an interesting way. In his texts, based on dichotomies – e.g. between *virtus* and *fortuna* as well as between just and unjust wars – there are numerous passages in which it is possible to find examples of trickery vocabulary. He established that both the Romans and aliens were ready to make ultimate sacrifices in order to defeat their enemies. They used weather conditions, surprise, military position and their own ingeniousness to achieve victory.

Key words: Florus, *Epitome de Tito Livio*, historiography, *dolus*, *fraus*, *ars*, *consilium*

[...] regnum dolo partum sic egit (sc. Servius Tullius)
industrie, ut iure adeptus videretur².

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The main aim of this article is to expand an issue, which was briefly addressed in my doctoral dissertation "Florus' vision of Rome", defended on 10th October 2016.

² Flor. 1, 1, 2: "[...] filled (sc. Servius Tullius) the position, thus obtained by craft, with so much diligence that he seemed to have acquired it by right" [Florus: *Epitome of Roman history*. Transl. E.S. Foster. London 1929].

Ancient languages provide us with a great variety of vocabulary connected with ancient military tactics and trickery. Among the equivalents of Greek terms such as *sophia*, *techne*, *mechane*, *dolos*, *apate* and *phronesis*, it is possible to list Latin *consilium* (plan), *dolos* (trick), *fraus* (deceit) and *insidiae* (trick, ambush). However, it is necessary to stress that only a few of them have a Greek etymology while the majority are simply Latin terms denoting trickery or cunning³. All of them were frequently used in both ancient poetry and prose. As far as the latter is concerned it is impossible to discount a large number of historiographical texts, including the *Epitome de Tito Livio*, written by Lucius Annaeus Florus in the 2nd century A.D.

An analysis of Florus' text gives the reader an opportunity to discern the principal elements on which it is constructed: the periodization of history analogous to stages of human growth and the differentiation between *virtus* and *fortuna* – which are the reflection of human values and the divine element respectively – as well as the dichotomy of just and unjust wars. Just wars – waged in defence of boundaries or allies or for acquiring new territories – led to the creation of a strong, powerful Roman Empire, while unjust wars – fratricidal and domestic wars – weakened it and contributed to its fall. This division of wars lies at the core of Florus' history, in which we can find numerous passages describing military tactics and strategies. Both Romans and aliens tried different ways to tip the balance of the conflict towards their own victory. They were more or less effective but always aimed at defending the enemies.

For the Romans *dolos* was the opposite of good faith. In a narrow sense it directly designates fraud. In a wider context it refers to all actions or social behaviour, which contravene proper moral values⁴. At first glance the problem of deceit during military actions was established early in pre-Republican history as one of many martial qualities. Thanks to its utility and aims Roman duplicity could have been regarded as positive and effective. Romulus was the first to use ambush (*insidiae*) and simulated fight (*fugae quoque, quae simulanda erat*) during the conquest of the Fidenae⁵. Such tactics were later used eagerly by the Romans over the course of their history⁶. In an analysis of the *Epitome de Tito Livio* it is important to stress that Florus tried to remain objective in his judgements. His opinions were characterized by pragmatism, which was a strong foundation for appreciation of the author among the ancient writers. His idea of outlining the true history is visible in the descriptions of wars – in which he presented the Romans in unfavour-

³ E.L. Wheeler: *Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery*. Leiden 1988, p. 50.

⁴ H. Coing: *Analysis of moral values by case-law*. In: *Law, culture and values: Essays in honor of Gray L. Dorsey*. Ed. S.A. Vojcanin. London 1990, p. 105.

⁵ Liv. 1. 14. 7–8.

⁶ P. Lee-Stecum: *Mendacia maiorum: Tales of deceit in pre-republican Rome*. In: *Private and public lies. The discourse of despotism and deceit in the Graeco-Roman world*. Ed. A.J. Turner, J.H.K. On Chong-Gossard, F.J. Vervaeke. Leiden 2010, pp. 250–251.

able ways with reference to the decline of Roman morality and critical assessments of both internal and external conflicts⁷. The passages in which he described both Roman and alien trickery display his consciousness and honesty in creating a judicious history, which identified both fair and unfair protagonists. Describing the history of Rome Florus willingly used terms such as *consilium*⁸, *sollertia*⁹, *ars*¹⁰, *dolus*, *fraus*, *furtum*¹¹ and *calliditas*¹². Some of them directly relate to deceptions and trickery practised in order to win a battle or rise to power. The first example is the noun *dolus*, which is related to the Greek equivalent *dolos*¹³. In the first chapter of *Epitome* Florus described the heroism of Horatius, who defeated the *Albani* by faking his own escape:

Tribus quippe illinc vulneratis, hinc duobus occisis, qui supererat Horatius addito ad virtutem dolo, ut distraheret hostem, simulat fugam singulosque, prout sequi poterant, adortus exsuperat¹⁴.

After his brothers' death Horatius provoked his enemies into a pursuit during which they were killed. His action was not only brave but also effective and very smart. In the quoted passage there is a phrase particularly worth noting, namely *addito ad virtutem dolo*. As an interesting side note, I can add that the same construction appears also in the description of the Battle of the Raudine Plain. The Romans fought there against the tribe of Cimbri, who were led by king Boiorix. Florus wrote about the successful military tactics of Marius, who used the meteorological conditions¹⁵ to surprise his enemies and to delay their reactions:

Istic quoque imperator addiderat virtuti—dolum secutus Hannibalem artemque Cannarum; primum nebulosum nactus diem ut hosti inopinatus occurreret, tum ventosum quoque, ut pulvis in oculos et ora ferretur, tum acie conversa in orientem, ut, quod ex captivis mox cognitum est, ex splendore galearum ac percussu quasi ardere caelum videretur¹⁶.

⁷ E. Gryksa: *Obraz Rzymu u Florusa*. Tarnów 2017, pp. 61–62.

⁸ Flor. 1, 1, 15; 1, 13, 14; 1, 22, 26; 1, 24, 6; 1, 34, 14; 1, 41, 14; 2, 6, 8; 2, 10, 2; 2, 12, 1; 1, 13, 38; 2, 13, 43; 2, 13, 52; 2, 13, 59; 2, 17, 4; 2, 33, 55–56; 2, 33, 59–60.

⁹ Flor. 1, 1, 3; 2, 14, 5.

¹⁰ Flor. 1, 18, 7; 1, 18, 8; 1, 22, 31; 1, 28, 7; 1, 47, 10; 2, 13, 32; 2, 33, 59.

¹¹ Flor. 2, 15, 2.

¹² Flor. 1, 33, 15; 1, 39, 3.

¹³ Donat. *Ad Ter., Eun.* 515 = 3, 3, 9.

¹⁴ Flor. 1, 1, 4: "For when three had been wounded on one side and two killed on the other, the surviving Horatius, adding craft to valour, pretended flight in order to separate his adversaries, and attacking them singly, in the order in which they were able to follow him, overcame them" [transl. E.S. Foster].

¹⁵ Plut. *Mar.* 26, 4.

¹⁶ Flor. 1, 38, 15: "On this occasion too our general had added craft to courage, imitating Hannibal and his stratagem at Cannae. For, in the first place, the day he had chosen was misty, so that he

Marius' army succeeded in establishing supremacy and defeated the Cimbri. It is worth stressing that even women fought till the end of the battle¹⁷. Furthermore, the idea of conscious *imitatio Hannibalis*¹⁸ is important here. Having studied the local terrain and weather conditions, he used them against the Romans¹⁹ e.g. during the Battle of Cannae:

When Hannibal led out his army at Cannae, where the plain was sandy, he placed them with the wind blowing from behind them. The Romans could not bear the sand, which was blown into their eyes, and they were routed²⁰.

Among the causes of the Roman defeat at Cannae researchers mentioned especially the tactical system. The weak point was undoubtedly the heavy infantry²¹ (e.g. its distribution)²².

Another example of using a deceit strategy can be found in the story of the conquest of Gabia. This event was also described by Livy, who put the emphasis on the fact that deceit and betrayal were not typical Roman methods:

Excepit deinde lentius spe bellum, quo Gabios, propinquam urbem, neququam vi adortus, cum obsidendi quoque urbem spes pulso a moenibus adempta esset, postremo minime arte Romana, fraude ac dolo, adgressus est²³.

In his work Livy presents conspicuous views on bravery, deceit and on how much worse all things are in his time than they were before. He refers repeatedly to religious and secular authorities, rules which should be obeyed²⁴. Despite Livy's opinion about Romans' attitude towards deceitful and clandestine operations, there is no doubt that over the years they were willing to employ various deception

could charge the enemy unawares, and it was also windy, so that the dust was driven into the eyes and faces of the enemy; finally, he had drawn up his line facing the west, so that, as was afterwards learned from the prisoners, the sky seemed to be on fire with the glint reflected from the bronze of the Roman helmets" [transl. E.S. Foster].

¹⁷ Oros. 5, 16, 17–19; Flor. 1, 38, 17; Plut. *Mar.* 27, 2–3.

¹⁸ P. Matusiak: *Obraz Hannibala w literaturze antycznej*. Katowice 2015, p. 134.

¹⁹ Polyæn. *Strat.* 6, 38, 5–6; Front. 3, 2, 7; Front. 2, 5, 25; Plut. *Fab. Max.* 16.

²⁰ Polyæn. *Strat.* 6, 38, 4.

²¹ B.T. Carey, J.B. Alifree, J. Cairns: *Ostatnia bitwa Hannibala. Zama i upadek Kartaginy*. Przeł. B. Waligórska-Olejniczak. Warszawa 2010, p. 99.

²² P. Kozioł: *Hannibal vs. Maharbal – rozważania na temat możliwości marszowych armii antycznych*. In: *Res militaris. Studia nad historią wojen i wojskowości w starożytności*. Ed. D. Wąsaszak. Oświęcim 2013, pp. 107–129.

²³ Liv. 1, 53, 4: "He then engaged in an unexpectedly tedious war with Gabii, a neighbouring town. After first assaulting the place in vain, he laid siege to it, but this attempt was as unsuccessful as the other, for he was driven off from the walls; and he finally resorted to the policy, so unlike a Roman, of deceit and trickery" [transl. B.O. Foster].

²⁴ *Omnibus I: Biblical and Classical civilizations*. Ed. D. Wilson, G.T. Fischer. Lancaster 2005, p. 220.

schemes. In their clever actions the Romans especially used surprise and speed in order to gain psychological and military advantage over the enemy, to neutralize the opponent's strength, to conserve resources and to boost the morale and confidence of the Roman troops on the battlefield²⁵.

According to the Florus' history, Tarquin's son was sent to the Gabines in order to win their confidence²⁶. When he had achieved that goal, he sent a messenger to his father. Tarquin made no response, he was strolling through his garden and knocking off poppy seed heads instead²⁷. This behavior was completely unintelligible to the messenger as it was a type of a secret language (*tacitis ambagibus*) unknowable to anyone except Tarquin and his son²⁸. On Tarquin's advice his son decided to execute all notable citizens and conquered the Gabii:

Sexto ubi quid vellet parens quidve praeciperet tacitis ambagibus patuit, primores civitatis criminando alios apud populum, alios sua ipsos invidia opportunos interemit. Multi palam, quidam in quibus minus speciosa criminatio erat futura clam interfecti. Patuit quibusdam volentibus fuga, aut in exilium acti sunt, absentiumque bona iuxta atque interemptorum divisui fuere. Largitiones inde praedaeque; et dulcedine privati commodi sensus malorum publicorum adimi, donec orba consilio auxilioque Gabina res regi Romano sine ulla dimicatione in manum traditur²⁹.

Tarquin the Superb was the first king expelled from Rome, whose violations of constitutional principles precipitated revolution and initiated the creation of the

²⁵ R.M. Sheldon: *Intelligence activities in Ancient Rome. Trust in the gods but verify*. London 2005, pp. 34–35.

²⁶ P. Lee-Stecum: *Mendacia maiorum: Tales of deceit in pre-republican Rome*. In: *Private and public lies. The discourse of despotism and deceit in the Graeco-Roman world*. Ed. A.J. Turner, J.H.K. On Chong-Gossard, F.J. Vervaeke. Leiden 2010, pp. 251–252: This episode is given various judgements in ancient sources. Valerius Maximus (7, 4, 1) regarded it as praiseworthy shrewdness in war. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (4, 51, 6) gave it a positive assessment, while Livy characterized Sextus' stratagem with a strong emphasis on fraud and dolus, which is untypical of the Roman nature.

²⁷ Flor. 1, 1, 7.

²⁸ A. Feldherr: "Livy's revolution: civic identity and the creation of the res publica". In: *The Roman cultural revolution*. Ed. T. Habinek, A. Schiesaro. Cambridge 1997, p. 146.

²⁹ Liv. 1, 54, 5–6: "As soon as it was clear to Sextus what his father meant and what was the purport of his silent hints, he rid himself of the chief men of the state. Some he accused before the people; against others he took advantage of the odium they had themselves incurred. Many were openly executed; some, whom it would not have looked well to accuse, were put to death in secret. Some were permitted, if they chose, to leave the country; or they were driven into banishment, and once out of the way, their property was forfeited, just as in the case of those who had been put to death. Thence came largesse and spoils, and in the sweetness of private gain men lost their feeling for the wrongs of the nation, until, deprived of counsel and aid, the state of Gabii was handed over unresisting to the Roman king" [transl. B.O. Foster].

Republic³⁰. The time when the Roman citizens were given the right to assemble in order to enact rules and elect the annual officeholders had a strong impact on history of the whole world³¹. In those times Rome was still inhabited by people who respected the values of *mores maiorum*. They were religious, fair-minded, patient, helpful and – most importantly – ready to give their lives for the fellow citizens' safety and for the good of the state. Such an attitude was repeatedly lauded by Florus, for whom the Roman *virtus* was a strong foundation for supremacy over the Mediterranean world. Due to respect for traditional values Rome achieved the stability after the expulsion of the Tarquins. It did not weaken even during the battle with Porsenna, when Horatius Cocles, Cloelia³² and Mucius Scaevola came to the fore. Their bravery and strength astounded the Etruscan king, who gave up conquering Rome and supporting the Tarquins³³. One of the mentioned heroes – Mucius Scaevola – also used a trick³⁴ against Porsenna:

Mucius Scaevola regem per insidias in castris ipsius adgreditur, sed ubi frustrato circa purpuratum eius ictu tenetur, ardentibus focus inicit manum terroremque geminat dolo. “En, ut scias” inquit, “quem virum effugeris; idem trecenti iuravimus”; cum interim—inmane dictu—hic interritus, ille trepidaret, tamquam manus regis arderet³⁵.

Mucius crossed the Tiber in order to kill Porsenna. When they met he put his right hand³⁶ into the fire³⁷. In this way he tried to prove his heroism and virtuous patriot-

³⁰ O. Johnson: *Rehearing the revolution. Radical Performance, radical politics in the English restoration*. London 2000, p. 104.

³¹ F. Millar: *The Roman Republic in Political Thought*. London 2002, p. 1.

³² M.B. Roller: “Exemplarity in Roman culture: The cases of Horatius Cocles and Cloelia”. *Classical Philology* 2004. T. 99, no 1, pp. 1–56.

³³ G. Forsythe: *A critical history of Early Rome: from prehistory to the First Punic War*. London 2005, p. 149.

³⁴ Polyæn. *Strat.* 8, 8.

³⁵ Flor. 1, 4, 5–6: “Mucius Scaevola by a stratagem attempted an attack upon the king in his own camp, and when he was seized after aiming a blow by mistake at his purple-clad attendants, placed his hand in a blazing fire and by a crafty device doubled the king’s alarm. „Behold,” he said, „and know from what sort of a man you have escaped; three hundred of us have sworn to attempt the same deed.” Meanwhile, incredible to relate, Mucius was unafraid, but the king was startled as though his own hand were burning” [transl. E.S. Foster].

³⁶ It is worth mentioning that in Roman culture the right hand was associated with positive qualities e.g. agency, rectitude and good fortune, while the left one referred to passivity, deceit, dishonor and uncleanness. The right hand was supposed to be correctly used to perform tasks that did not have negative connotations. Right-handedness also played a significant role in the army as being favoured and of preferential status. E. Swift: *Roman Artefacts and Society: design, behaviour, and experience*. Oxford 2017, p. 190.

³⁷ This behaviour would have underscored his deceit, especially because this was a traditional punishment for breaking an oath or pledge. It seems to be an element of traditional Roman heroic stories (see also: Val. Max. 3, 3, 2). In Livy the same theme was used not merely to embellish a story

ism and persuade the Etruscan king that the young Roman warriors stood ready to fight and kill him³⁸, which was also mentioned by Plutarch:

ἔφη δὲ τὸν φόβον τοῦ Πορσίνα νενικηκῶς ἡττάσθαι τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ χάριτι μὴνύειν ἃ πρὸς ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἂν ἐξηγόρευσε. ‘τριακόσιοι γὰρ Ῥωμαίων,’ ἔφη, ‘τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ γνώμην ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ σου πλανῶνται καιρὸν ἐπιτηροῦντες· ἐγὼ δὲ κλήρῳ λαχὼν καὶ προεπιχειρήσας οὐκ ἄχθομαι τῇ τύχῃ, διαμαρτῶν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φίλου μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμίου’³⁹.

The tales of Horatius Cocles⁴⁰, Cloelia⁴¹ and Mucius Scaevola became *exempla* of Roman moral values and proved their readiness to sacrifice themselves in order to save Rome and its citizens. In Florus’ history we can find numerous examples of virtue and moral courage.

Respecting use of the term *dolus* it is necessary to add that also Rome’s enemies were also trying to achieve victory by resorting to trickery. Pyrrhus’ strategy during the Battle of Beneventum was unsuccessful from the very beginning. He wanted to occupy the area located high behind Curius’ camp and suddenly attack Roman soldiers. His plan ended in failure, which was described by Plutarch:

περιόντι δὲ αὐτῷ μακρὰν καὶ δασεῖαν ὕλαις ὁδὸν οὐκ ἀντέσχε τὰ φῶτα, καὶ πλάναι τοῖς στρατιώταις συνέτυχον· καὶ περὶ ταῦτα γινομένης διατριβῆς ἡ τε

but as the centrepiece of his narrative account. Perhaps it could be also interpreted with reference to the Augustan regime under which Livy was writing. *A companion to Livy*. Ed. B. Mineo. Oxford 2015, p. 199.

³⁸ C. Grottanelli: *Kings and Prophets. Monarchic power, inspired leadership, and sacred text in Biblical Narrative*. Oxford 1999, p. 52.

³⁹ Plut. *Publ.* 17, 4: “Then he said that although he had conquered the fear which Porsena inspired, he was vanquished by the nobility which he displayed, and would reveal out of gratitude what he would not have disclosed under compulsion. «Three hundred Romans, then» said he, «with the same resolution as mine, are now prowling about in thy camp and watching their opportunity. I was chosen by lot to make the first attempt upon thee, and I am not distressed at what has happened, so noble is the man whom I failed to kill, and so worthy to be a friend rather than an enemy of the Romans»” [transl. B. Perrin].

⁴⁰ R. Kaufman: *Our Young Folk’s Plutarch*. Chapel Hill 2007, p. 89: His agnomen “Cocles” was given to him because of the fact that he had only one eye, having lost the other in the wars. Together with Herminius and Lartius he defended the wooden bridge over the river Tiber and kept the enemy back until his own party cut it down behind him.

⁴¹ S.A. Takacs: *Vestal virgins, Sibils, and Matrons: Women in Roman religion*. Texas 2008, p. 13: Cloelia was a warrior type, who exhibited strength and skill till the end of the battle. Livy defined her as *dux agminis virginum* (2, 13, 6). Her successful fight infuriated Porsenna, who demanded her return promising to give her back. Then she was given the choice of rescuing a half of the Roman hostages, who were in the Etruscan camp. She chose boys under the age of puberty, the group especially vulnerable to injury and in that way she demonstrated the importance of civic responsibility.

νὺξ ἐπέλιπε καὶ καταφανὴς ἦν ἅμ' ἡμέρᾳ τοῖς πολέμοις ἐπερχόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων, ὥστε θόρυβον πολὺν καὶ κίνησιν παρασχεῖν⁴².

More details are given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus:

ἔμελλον ὅπερ εἰκὸς οἱ ὀπλίται κράνεσι καὶ θώραξι καὶ θυρεοῖς βαρεῖς πρὸς ὀχθηρὰ χωρία καὶ μακρὰς ἀτραποὺς πορευόμενοι καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας λεωφόρους, ἀλλ' αἰγότριβας δι' ὕλης τε καὶ κρημνῶν τάξιν τε οὐδεμίαν φυλάξειν, καὶ πρὶν ἐπιφανῆναί σφισι τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξασθενήσιν τὰ σώματα δίνει καὶ κόπῳ⁴³.

Pyrrhus was conscious of the Roman supremacy and strength so he decided to deceive his enemies:

Quippe post primam victoriam intellecta vir callidus virtute Romana statim desperavit armis seque ad dolos contulit. Nam interemptos cremavit, captivosque indulgenter habuit et sine pretio restituit, missisque legatis in urbem omni modo adnexus est, ut facto foedere in amicitiam reciperetur⁴⁴.

Pyrrhus' defeat during the battle was caused by the elephants turning on their own line⁴⁵. A strong blow had frightened one of them. It caused panic among the animals which started trampling everything in their path. The defeat of Pyrrhus was a turning point in the history of Rome. It was the final act in the conquest of Italy and the moment when the Romans began to focus their attention on the wider world⁴⁶.

The Gauls were described by Florus as people who willingly resorted to deceit (*Nemo tantum feroces dixerit Gallos: fraudibus agunt*⁴⁷). As the result of an ambush, Aurunculeius Cotta and Titurius Sabinus died:

⁴² Plut. *Pyrrh.* 25, 3: "But since he took a long circuit through a densely wooded country, his lights did not hold out, and his soldiers lost their way and straggled. This caused delay, so that the night passed, and at daybreak he was in full view of the enemy as he advanced upon them from the heights, and caused much tumult and agitation among them" [transl. B. Perrin].

⁴³ D.H. *Antiquitates Romanae*, 20, 11, 1: "It was bound to happen, as might have been expected, that hoplites burdened with helmets, breastplates and shields and advancing against hilly positions by long trails that were not even used by people but were mere goat-paths through woods and crags, would keep no order and, even before the enemy came in sight, would be weakened in body by thirst and fatigue" [transl. E. Cary].

⁴⁴ Flor. 1, 13, 14: "[...] for after his first victory the wily king, recognizing the valour of the Romans, immediately gave up hope of military success and had recourse to craft. For he burnt the bodies of the slain, treated his prisoners with indulgence and gave them back without ransom, and sending ambassadors to Rome strove by every device to obtain a treaty and be admitted to friendship" [transl. E.S. Foster].

⁴⁵ T. Keightley: *The history of Rome*. London 1836, p. 168.

⁴⁶ *The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization*. Ed. S. Homblower, A. Spawforth, E. Eidinow. Oxford 2014, p. 674.

⁴⁷ Flor. 1, 45, 7.

Indutiomarus Treveros, Ambiorix concitavit Eburones. Vtrique absente Caesare coniuratione facta invasere legatos. Sed ille fortiter a Dolabella submotus est, relatumque regis caput; hic insidis in valle dispositis dolo perculit. Itaque et castra direpta sunt et Aurunculeium Cottam cum Titurio Sabino legatos amisimus. Nec ulla de rege mox ultio; quippe perpetua trans Rhenum fuga latuit⁴⁸.

In the passages quoted above the next examples of the trickery vocabulary are worth bearing in mind. Florus, apart from the noun *dolus*, used here the terms *insidiae* (ambush) and *fraus* (trick). The first of these can be found in the *Epitome de Tito Livio* in several other passages⁴⁹. The ambush at the narrow valley called Caudine Forks⁵⁰, during the military campaign of Veturius and Albinus⁵¹ into Samnium, was set by the Pontius' army, while Iugurtha was trapped by his own father-in-law:

Sic fraudulentissimus regum fraude gener soceri sui in insidias deductus Sullae in manum traditur, tandemque opertum catenis Iugurtham in triumpho populus Romanus adspexit⁵².

The term *fraus* in various inflections is often found in Florus' text⁵³. It is the Latin equivalent of the Greek term *apate* and its roots intertwine with those of Greek *thrauein* (to break) and *titroskein* (to wound, damage). Its most appropriate understanding is connected with the ancient idea of *fides*, in terms of relations based on mutual confidence and obligations.

The Romans attached significance to *fides* itself, regarding it as honesty and reliability – especially in the matter of keeping one's word. Generally, the cases of contravening its rules were few. The Romans boasted about their *fides* and proudly

⁴⁸ Flor. 1, 45, 7–8: "Indutiomarus stirred up the Treveri, Ambiorix the Eburones. In Caesar's absence these two tribes banded together and attacked the lieutenant-generals. Indutiomarus was bravely repulsed by Dolabella, and his head was brought back to the camp. Ambiorix, however, defeated us by the stratagem of an ambush set in a valley, with the result that our camp was plundered and we lost the lieutenant-generals Aurunculeius Cotta and Titurius Sabinus. No immediate vengeance was taken upon the king, who eluded our vigilance by perpetual flight across the Rhine" [transl. E.S. Foster].

⁴⁹ Flor. 1, 4, 5; 1, 33, 17.

⁵⁰ E.L. Wheeler: *Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery*. Leiden 1988, p. 63: According to the ancient tradition, in 321 B.C., after trapping the Roman army in the Caudine Forks, the Samnites were maneuvered out of their success through Roman insults in the peace making process. They could justly complain that Roman always gave *fraus* the semblance of law: *Et semper aliquam fraudi speciem iuris impositis* (Liv. 9, 11, 7).

⁵¹ Flor. 1, 11, 10.

⁵² Flor. 1, 36, 17: "Thus the most treacherous of kings was entrapped by the treachery of his own father-in-law and handed over to Sulla, and at last the Roman people saw Jugurtha led in triumph loaded with chains" [transl. E.S. Foster].

⁵³ Flor. 1, 1, 7; 1, 11, 7; 1, 22, 13; 1, 33, 6; 1, 33, 7; 2, 10, 9.

opposed it to that of *Graeca* and *Punica*. It was even described by Cicero as *fundamentum iustitiae* (*De officiis* 1, 7, 23). In the ancient times there were several normative acts which were based on *fides* rules, such as *fidepromissio* and *fideiussio*. Furthermore, there was an idea of *bona fides* including the informal *pacta adiecta*, covering such circumstances as *dolus* or *metus*. The idea of *fides* was also crucial in international public law. It was invoked in various treaties. Even in the case of *deditio*, when enemies were forced to surrender to victorious Rome, there were mutual obligations also based on this concept of loyalty⁵⁴.

The range of meanings of *fraus* goes through “injury” and “damage” to the sense of breach of faith – “injury to *fides*”. In law it can be interpreted on the basis of two concepts: “to act for deceit of the law” (*in fraudem legis facere*) and “to do damage to the law” (*fraudem legi facere*). As a general term for deceit this term appears already in Plautus and Terence⁵⁵.

The moral intellectual heritage of the tradition known as *mos maiorum* is thought to be a basis on which Rome was strengthened during the period of the Empire. This canon of concepts, values and traditional usage lost its significance with the decline of collective fear of external enemies⁵⁶. The latter had compelled the Romans to remain united for their safety and salvation for a long time⁵⁷. It is common among researchers to observe that the relation between *metus hostilis* and domestic harmony is of great importance especially for Sallust⁵⁸. The turning point was the destruction of Carthage, which – according to historians’ relations – led to inevitable Roman decline⁵⁹. The solidarity, that had joined people together in order to defend the country against a foreign enemy disappeared in 146 B.C. and this caused the decline of Roman morality, which took various forms, from corruption to fratricidal wars.

After the collapse of Carthage the Romans turned towards Numidia, the next most important kingdom in Africa. When Micipsa died, Jugurtha – a brilliant man, who had served under Scipio during the Numantine war – killed his cousins (Hiempsal and Adherbal) in order to seize to power⁶⁰. According to Florus’ history, fortune itself gave an opportunity to capture him deceitfully:

Citra spem omnium fortuna cessit, ut rex fraude praecipuus fraude caperetur⁶¹.

⁵⁴ W. Litewski: *Podstawowe wartości prawa rzymskiego*. Kraków 2001, pp. 22–23.

⁵⁵ E.L. Wheeler: *Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery*. Leiden 1988, pp. 63–65.

⁵⁶ G.B. Conte: *Latin Literature: a history*. Baltimore 1994, p. 799.

⁵⁷ D.J. Kapust: *Republicanism, rhetoric and Roman Political Thought: Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus*. Cambridge 2011, p. 53.

⁵⁸ I.D. Evrigenis: *Fear of enemies and collective action*. Cambridge 2007, p. 41.

⁵⁹ R. Ash: “Fission and fusion: shifting Roman identities in the *Histories*”. In: *The Cambridge Companion to Tacitus*. Ed. A.J. Woodman. Cambridge 2009, p. 96.

⁶⁰ P.A. Zoch: *Ancient Rome: an introductory history*. Oclahoma 2012, p. 149.

⁶¹ Flor. 1, 36, 2: “Contrary to general expectation, fate decreed that a king preeminent in stratagem should himself be ensnared by a stratagem” [transl. E.S. Foster].

The first crime, like the others, was based on an ambush⁶². In his policy Jugurtha often had recourse to corruption. The introduction of luxury was – in Salust's opinion – a key to the final stage of the Empire's decline. Avarice and ambition were in this case the main vices regarded as the "root of all evil"⁶³ especially among the Roman aristocracy:

Bellum scripturus sum, quod populus Romanus cum Iugurtha rege Numidarum gessit, primum quia magnum et atrox variaque victoria fuit, dein quia tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est; quae contentio divina et humana cuncta permiscuit eoque vecordiae processit, ut studiis civilibus bellum atque vastitas Italiae finem faceret⁶⁴.

The war against Jugurtha began in 110 B.C. and resulted in a crushing defeat for the Romans. That was the reason why the following year the Senate decided to send Quintus Caecilius Metellus to fight. In the face of a foreseeable failure he was supported by the commander Gaius Marius, thanks to whom the course of the conflict took a positive turn⁶⁵. He proceeded to attack the cities of Capsa and Molo-chath, where he was joined by Lucius Cornelius Sulla⁶⁶. In the meantime Jugurtha was supported by the king Bocchus, whose failure resulted in Jugurtha's defeat:

Mox non ipsum modo, sed Bocchum quoque Mauretaniae regem, iure sanguinis Numidam vindicantem, apud oppidum Cirtam graviter cecidit. Qui ubi diffusus rebus suis alienae cladis accessio fieri timet, pretium foederis atque amicitiae regem facit. Sic fraudulentissimus regum fraude gener soceri sui in insidias deductus Sullae in manum traditur, tandemque opertum catenis Iugurtham in triumpho populus Romanus adspexit⁶⁷.

⁶² Flor. 1, 36, 3: [...] primum scelus mandat insidiis.

⁶³ S. Breuniger: *Recovering Bishop Berkeley: Virtue and society in the Anglo-Irish context*. New York 2010, p. 75.

⁶⁴ Sal. *Iug.* 5, 1–2: "I am about to relate the war which the Roman people carried on with Jugurtha, King of the Numidians; first, because it was great, sanguinary, and of varied fortune; and secondly, because then, for the first time, opposition was offered to the power of the nobility; a contest which threw everything, religious and civil, into confusion, and was carried to such a height of madness, that nothing but war, and the devastation of Italy, could put an end to civil dissensions" [transl. J.S. Watson].

⁶⁵ W.E. Heitland: *The Roman Republic*. Vol. 2, Cambridge 1909, pp. 339–349.

⁶⁶ W.W. How, H.D. Leigh: *A history of Rome to the Death of Caesar*. London 1896, p. 369.

⁶⁷ Flor. 1, 36, 15–17: "Presently he defeated not only Jugurtha himself but also Bocchus, king of Mauretania, who from ties of kinship was supporting the Numidians, near the city of Cirta. Bocchus, apprehensive about his own interests and afraid of being involved in another's ruin, offered the person of Jugurtha as the price of a treaty and friendship. Thus the most treacherous of kings was entrapped by the treachery of his own father-in-law and handed over to Sulla, and at last the Roman people saw Jugurtha led in triumph loaded with chains" [transl. E.S. Foster].

Being afraid of a possible defeat Bocchus decided to hand over Jugurtha in exchange for his own safety and an alliance with Romans. Jugurtha was ultimately entrapped and carried in chains to Rome, where he adorned the triumph of the conqueror on 1st January 104 B.C. Later he was starved to death in a foul dungeon, which had been carved into the Capitoline rock⁶⁸.

In Florus' history the term *consilium* (deliberation, plan, purpose) is also worth mentioning. It was first used by Cicero as a direct equivalent of the Greek term *strategema*. Similarly, Valerius Maximus described four of his examples of Roman *strategemata* with term *consilium*, while Frontinus listed it as an integral component of *strategemata* and subsequently used it as a synonym⁶⁹.

For the first time with the primary meaning of stratagem, *consilium* can be found in the chapter describing Ventidius' war against the Parthians. Undoubtedly the Roman victory was decided by his deceit:

Nec sine consilio ducis, qui simulato metu adeo passus est hostem castris succedere, donec absumpto iactus spatio adimeret usum sagittarum⁷⁰.

Ventidius successfully overcame both invaders. In 39 B.C., in the Battle of Mount Taurus and at the Cilician Gates, he captured and killed Labienus. Later, during the Battle of Gindarus in Cyrrhestica he defeated the Arsacid prince Pacorus⁷¹.

However, the peace between the Romans and the Parthians was broken by Antonius, who demanded power and honours for himself. His insidiousness was described here with the term *ars*, which can be regarded as the Latin equivalent of Greek *technē*⁷²:

Sed—immensa vanitas hominis—domus titulorum cupidine Araxen et Euphraten sub imaginibus suis legi concupiscit, neque causa neque consilio ac ne imaginaria quidem belli indictione, quasi hoc quoque ex arte ducis esset obrepere, relicta repente Syria in Parthos impetum fecit⁷³.

⁶⁸ W.W. How, H.D. Leigh: *A history of Rome to the Death of Caesar*. London 1896, p. 371.

⁶⁹ E.L. Wheeler: *Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery*. Leiden 1988, p. 53.

⁷⁰ Flor. 2, 19, 6: "The defeat was not inflicted without a stratagem on the part of the general, who, under a pretence of panic, allowed the enemy to approach so close to the camp that he prevented them from making use of their arrows by depriving them of room to shoot" [transl. E.S. Foster].

⁷¹ D.L. Vagi: *Coinage and History of the Roman Empire. C. 82 B.C. – A.D. 480: History*. Chicago 1999, pp. 69–70.

⁷² E.L. Wheeler: *Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery*. Leiden 1988, p. 57.

⁷³ Flor. 2, 20, 2: "But such was the exceeding vanity of the man that, in his desire for fresh titles of honour, he longed to have the Araxes and Euphrates inscribed beneath his statues, and, without any pretext or design and without even a pretended declaration of war, just as if it were part of the art of generalship to attack by stealth, he left Syria and made a sudden attack upon the Parthians" [transl. E.S. Foster].

In 36 B.C. Antonius decided to conduct a military expedition against Phraates IV through Armenia. He was forced to retreat because of considerable casualties, caused both by the enemies' treacherous attacks⁷⁴ and arduous conditions:

Infesta primum siti regio, tum quibusdam salmacidae [fluvius] infestiores, novissime quae iam ab invalidis et audite hauriebantur noxiae etiam dulces fuere. Mox et ardores per Armeniam et nives per Cappadociam et utriusque caeli subita mutatio pro pestilentia fuit⁷⁵.

Only in 34 B.C. was Antony able to reorganize his army and restore the Roman power. However, his plan of Parthia conquer was restricted to defeating the Armenia only. His later military actions were unsuccessful because of the deterioration in relation between Anthony and Octavianus⁷⁶.

All the examples of trickery vocabulary analyzed in this article, such as *dolus*, *fraus*, *ars* and *consilium* testify to Florus' skill as a writer. Florus – as an objective writer – did not avoid difficult and controversial topics in witting his work, but thanks to the variety of language forms and terms he presents he can easily focus his readers' attention and let them know the arcana of ancient history, tradition and culture.

⁷⁴ Flor. 2, 20, 3.

⁷⁵ Flor. 2, 20, 8–9: "In the first place the lack of water in the district was fatal, but still more fatal to some was the brackish water which they drank; and, finally, even fresh water was harmful when drunk with avidity by the soldiers in their already debilitated condition. Afterwards the heat in Armenia and the snows of Cappadocia and the sudden change from one climate to another were as destructive as a plague". [transl. E.S. Foster].

⁷⁶ M. Jaczynowska, M. Pawlak: *Starożytny Rzym*. Warszawa 2008, p. 158.